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VALUE JUDGEMENTS AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF 




The relevance of philosophy of science for science education has too long 
been neglected. By and large philosophers of science have failed to help science 
educators and most science educators have failed to profit fro m the insights of 
philosophy of science. In some recent publications this unhappy tendency has to 
some extent reversed itself.1 However, the full potential of philosophy of sci­
ence for science education has yet to be realized. In this paper I will not fight 
for ground already won; instead I will endeavor to suggest new paths that 
philosophy of science may open up for science education, new insights that 
philosophy of science may provide. 
Philosophy of science as it will be conceived of here has two basic tasks: 
(1) the analysis, clarification and critique of certain concepts, methods and 
problems found in all or nearly all science, e.g. the concepts of definition, 
observation, explanation, the methods of experimental inquiry, the problem of 
the comparability of scientific theories; (2) the analysis and clarification of 
concepts, methods and problems found in more rest�icted parts of science, e,g. 
the concept of operational definition of length in physics, the method of 
participant observation in anthropology, the problem of the objectivity of 
social science. Philosophy of science in this sense might be called analytic 
philosophy of science. , 
There are at least two contributions that analytic philosophy of science can 
make to science education. First, analytic philosophy of science may suggest 
new pedagogical insights and perspectives for science education, new ways of 
looking at and examining traditional approaches, new research problems and 
goals. Let us call the valu1e that philosophy of science may have in suggesting 
new approaches and problems the heuristic value of philosophy of science for 
science education. 
Secondly, analytic philosophy of science provides clarification and analysis 
of some of the major concepts in science education-namely, the concepts of 
science itself. Let us call the value that analytic philosophy of science has for 
science education in clarifying some of the concepts of science education the 
analytic value of analytic philosophy of science for science education. 
As we shall see, the analytic value and the heuristic value of analytic phi­
losophy of science go hand in hand. Philosophical analysis and clarification 
reveals distinctions, analogies, and ambiguities that are suggestive for science 
education. 
Analytic philosophy of science should be contrasted with a more traditional 
view of philosophy of science.2 Traditionally 'philosophy of science' was used 
*All futilre pu blication rights reserved by the author. 
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to refer to the construction of a scientific world view. The philosophy of science 
in this sense would attempt to construct a systematic and unified picture of the 
world as presented by the particular sciences. This enterprise-which might be 
called speculative philosophy of science-would attempt to answer questions 
about the origin of the universe (cosmology) as well as questions about the 
ultimate make-up of the universe (ontology). I cannot consider here the po�ible 
value of speculative philosophy of science for science education. However, I 
have argued elsewhere that it may have value. 3 
Analytic philosophy of science, as we have seen, clarifies and evaluates tne 
concepts, methods and problems of science. Such analysis and criticism can 
enter into science education in at least two ways: 
(1) Students of science could learn the analysis and criticism of scientific 
concepts, methods and problems. 
(2) Science educatorrs could learn the analysis and crirticism of scientific 
concepts, methods and problems. 
Now although I do not deny that the study of analytic philosophy of science 
may be useful for science students,4 I will concentrate here on the value of the 
study of analytic philosophy of science for science educators. I will discuss 
briefly some of the roles that value judgments play in connection with science 
and will then examine the recent controversy in philosophy of science over the 
acceptance of hypotheses. I hope to show that the clarification and analysis 
of the roles that values play in connection with science has both heuristic and 
analytic value for science educators. 
Values and Science 
There is no doubt that values and science are connected. First, science seems 
to be committed to certain general values, e.g. truth, knowledge and objectivity. 
Indeed, irt would seem that without such commitment science would be im­
possible. Secondly, scientists normally are committed to the value of partkular 
theories, techniques, approaches. Such commitment can lead to problems and, 
indeed, seems at times to conflict with the commitment of science itself to 
objectivity. 
Scientists are human; like everyone else their behavior and even their 
perceptions are sometimes affected by their value commitments. They believe 
that certain things are good or bad, and have strong feelings about this. Their be­
liefs and attitudes may induce them-either consciously or unconsciously-to 
overlook evidence or to misconstrue evidence that might go against their well­
entrenched views and commitments. As a result they may produce work which is 
biased. For example, a medical researcher with a strong liking for things 
oriental may tend to overlook negative evidence for the curative powers of 
acupuncture. Consequently his research report may be biased. 
This insidious influence of value commitment on the results of scientific 
research is something that ideally should be excluded from science. It is at 
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least in part a scientific question how the biasing of results can be prevented; 
what techniques and procedures scientists can use to prevent their value 
commitments from causing them to overlook evident"e and misread the data. 
However, the problem is partly an educational one as well. What pedagogical 
procedures are best for training scientists to be sensitive to negative evidence, to 
data that conflicts with their most cherished views?· I have suggested elsewhere 
some peqagogicaJ procedures for decreasing the insidious influence of theory 
laden observation.5 Other procedures, for example having science students sub­
ject their own value commitments to self-criticism, also need to be considered. 
Now scientists may not only have value commitments which result in biased 
findings; they may also be called upon to answer value questions. For example 
"Is science worth engaging �n?", "Is a particular scientific problem worth study­
ing?", "Should a particular scientific finding be given practical application?" It 
may be argued however that these questions, whatever their importance, ar� not 
questions a scientist qua scientist answers; that they are noi questions within 
science. The question of whether it is worth engaging in science, it may be 
argued, is a pre-scientific question as is the question of whether a particular 
scientific problem is worth studying. The question of whether certain scientific 
findings should be applied, it may be maintained, is a post-scientific question. 
I for one find this argument too pat. For the question of whether a certain 
problem is worth studying seems to be something that a scientist has special 
competence to answer since the answer to it should be based, at least in part, on 
the consequences of studying this problem for the growth of science. Similarly 
the answer to the question of whether a certain scientific finding should be 
applied to solve a practical problem should be based in part on the probability 
of success. 
Now it may be argued that answe1ing the question about the desirability of 
studying certain problems scientifically and the question about the desirability 
of applying the results of science also depends on value judgments, e.g. the 
value judgment that the growth of science is desirable or that the solution of a 
practical problem is desirable. These value judgments, it may be argued, are 
surely beyond the competence of the scientist. 
Whether or not value judgments are beyond the competence of the scientist 
depends on what view of ethics is correct. On a naturalistic interpretation, for 
example, value judgments are equivalent to scientific judgments. The question 
of the desirability of engaging in science is, then, on a naturalistic interpretation, 
a question that could be answered by science. 
Now given a naturalistic interpretation one might still want to call the above 
questions pre and post scientific, thus distinguishing them from the more typical 
questions arising within science. But on a naturalistic interpretation the distinc­
tion between pre and post scientific questions on the one hand and questions 
falling within science on the other clearly could not be made on the grounds that 
the scientist has no special competence to answer the former sort of question. 
There would be no basic difference between the methodology used to answer 
typical scientific questions. Consequently the scientist qua scientist would on a 
naturalistic interpretation answer these post and pre questions as well as 
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questions falling within science. 
Given a non-naturalistic interpret.ation of value judgments there would be 
basic methodological difference between questions within science and pre and 
post scientific questions. Whether a scientist qua scientist should be expected 
to answer pre and post questions of the sort we have been discussing would then 
be problematic. However, the important point to note is that the neat separation 
on methodological ground of these pre and post scientific questions from ques­
tions arising within science does seem to presuppose a particular meta-ethical 
position, namely non-naturalism. Without this presupposition the role of the 
scientist qua scientist is not so narrowly circumscribed. 
Suppose my suspicions are groundless and a scientist qua scientist should not 
answer what I have called pre and post scientific questions. Suppose that 
naturalism is untenable. A pedagogical issue of great importance can be raised. 
One can still ask: How should science education be conceived? Should science 
education be conceived of as an education designed to train a scientist qua 
scientist-an individual who has no training in answering pre and post scientific 
questions? One might well opt for science education more broadly conceived 
in which science students are trained not only qua scientists but in answering 
these pre and post scientific questions as well. Or one might argue that science 
education can be narrowly conceived so long as students of science are at some 
point given an education in problem solving in pre and post scientific questions. 
In any event, a case can be made for an education-call it a scientific 
education or not-which is concerned with value questions about the desirability 
of science, the desirability of studying certain problems rather than others, the 
desirability of the application of certain scientific results. Indeed, it is just these 
sorts of questions that relate science to humanistic concerns and traditions and 
illuminate science as a social institution. 
Now in recent years the major controversy among philosophers of science 
about the role of value judgments in relation to science has been over the 
question of whether scientists qua scientists should answer a rather different 
type of question, namely "Should a particular hypothesis be accepted?" It has 
been argued by some that this is a value question arising within science, that it is 
a question a scientist qua scientist answers. The basic argument for this position 
is this: No scientific hypothesis is ever certain; hence in the acceptance of a 
scientific hypothesis there is always the possibility of error. Consequently, 
whether a scientist accepts a scientific hypothesis or not will depend on the 
seriousness of the mistake of accepting the hypothesis if it is false. However, an 
answer to the question of whether a mistake is serious or not is certainly based 
on value judgments held by the scientist. But since the scientist qua scientist 
accepts hypotheses, value judgments are an essential part of science, they are 
found within science. On this view the value judgments connected with the 
acceptance of scientific hypotheses are legitimate and indeed indispensible in 
science. 
This view has not gone unchallenged. It has been argued that scientists qua 
scientists do not accept hypotheses and hence the value judgments connected 
with acceptance are not part of scientific practice. Put in the terms introduced 
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earlier, the argument is simply that the question of whether a hypothesis should 
be accepted or rejected is a post scientific question. As we have seen if natural· 
ism is correct, post scientific value questions are questions that a scientist qua 
scientist can answer. So the value questions connected with the acceptance of a 
hypothesis would be value questions a scientist qua scientist can answer. Thus 
this view must be committed to some form of non-naturalism. In any case, on 
this view scientists qua scientists gather evidence and specify how probable 
hypotheses are relative to the evidence, it is said. But as scientists they do not 
accept or reject such hypotheses. The acceptance of scientific hypotheses is left 
to others or to the scientist in some other role than that of scientist. This view, 
sometimes called "the odds maker view of science," has been advocated by such 
philosophers as Carnap6 and Jeffreys.7 
However even among those who argue that scientists qua scientists accept 
hypotheses there is controversy. The controversy is over what sort of value 
judgments are relevant to the acceptance of a hypothesis. On one view the accep­
tance of hypotheses depends on considerations of epistemic or theoretical value, 
i.e. values associated with achieving truth, simplicity, explanatory power and so 
on. This view has been advocated by Hempel8 and Levi.9 We will call it "the 
theoretical acceptance view." Another group of methodologists, namely 
Rudner,10 Braithwaite,11 Churchman1 2 and Leach,13 maintain that the values 
involved in the acceptance of scientific hypotheses are not completely epistemic 
or theoretical but also involve non-theoretical or practical values, values associa­
ted with human life, the saving of time and energy, and so on. Let us call this 
view "the practical acceptance view.'' 
Evaluation of the Controversy 
, 
In order to evaluate this controversy it is necessary first to clarify the notion 
of acceptance and then to clarify the nature of the claims of the parties to the 
controversy. 
Two different concepts of acceptance can be distinguished.1 4 In one sense of 
"acceptance" to accept a hypothesis ·is to Mlieve that it is true. Let us call his 
sort of acceptance, acceptanceB-the subscript B to remind us that this sense of 
acceptance has to do with the belief that the hypothesis is true. In science, of 
course, such a belief would be a tentative one subject to change in the light of 
new evidence and argument. 
In another sense of "acceptance" to accept a hypothesis is not necessarily to 
believe that the hypothesis is true; rather it is to be disposed to act as if the 
hypothesis is true in a given context because it is believed that the hypothesis is 
a useful working hypothesis in that context. Let us call this sense of acceptance, 
acceptanceu-the subscriptu to remind us that acceptance refers to the useful­
ness of the hypothesis as a working hypothesis in a certain context. Again, in 
science acceptance of this sort is tentative, subject to change in the light of the 
evidence. 
It is important to see that these two senses of acceptance are logically 
independent of each other in that one could acceptB a hypothesis H without 
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acceptingu H in a given contest and not acceptB H. For example, the evidence 
that a certain drug can cure cancer may be weak, so weak that it does not 
warrant our acceptanceB that the drug is effective; yet, since there is some 
evidence, albeit meager, for the effectiveness of the drug and good evidence that 
the drug has no damaging side effects, a medical therapist may acc;eptu the 
hypothesis, i.e. he may be disposed to act as if it is true in the context of 
medical therapy. Conversely, there may be strong evidence that a drug can cure 
cancer and yet some evidence that the drug has lethal side effects. One might 
therefore acceptB that the drug is a cure for cancer and yet not acceptu that the 
drug is a cure for cancer in the context of therapy; that is one would not pro­
ceed on the assumption that the drug was effective and start using it on cancer 
patients. 
Once the distinction between acceptance8 and acceptanceu is made there 
are several different things that the adversaries in the above-mentioned contro­
versy could be saying. Let us consider some of the possibilities connected with 
the odds maker view of science: 
(1) A scientist qua scientist can not accept8 any scientific hypothesis. 
(2) A scientist qua scientist can not acceptu any scientific hypothesis. 
(3) A scientist qua scientist does not acceptB any scientific hypothesis. 
(4) A scientist qua scientist does not acceptu any scientific hypothesis. 
(5) A scientist qua scientist should not acceptB any scientific hypothesis. 
(6) A scientist qua scientist should not acceptu any scientific hypothesis. 
Consider (1) and (2). The "can not" is to be understood as a logical "can 
not" in the sense that a brother can not be a female. Interpreted in this way 
(1) and (2) certainly seem to be dubious if "scientist qua scientist" is inter­
preted in its usual sense. It does not seem to be part of the ordinary meaning of 
"scientist. qua scientist" that a scientist qua scientist can not accept scientific 
hypotheses in either of the senses of acceptance. 
Of course, the claim may not be a claim about the ordinary meaning of 
"scientist qua scientist." Rather a proposal may be implicitly being made about 
how "scientist qua scientist should be understood. In short, (1) and (2) may be 
implicitly normative. We will consider the odds maker view as a normative 
claim in a moment. 
What about (3) and (4)? If (3) and (4) are factual statements they certainly 
seem dubious. Scientists qua scientists as a matter of fact certainly seem to 
accept some scientific hypotheses in both senses of "accept." It would seem 
that the most plausible way to interpret the claim of the odds makers view of 
science is not as a factual claim about what scientists qua scientists do not do or 
logical claim about what they can not do but as a normative claim about what 
they should not do-that is as (5) and (6). Given this interpretation the theo­
retical acceptance and the practical acceptance views can then be interpreted as 
claiming that (5) and (6) are mistaken although advocates of the theor�tical 
acceptance view and the practical acceptance view have different reasons for 
claiming that they are. 
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But is there any reason to suppose that these normative claims made by 
advocates of the odds maker view of science are correct? What might be the 
rationale for (5) and (6 )? 
It is not completely clear what rationale methodologists have for making 
these claims. But one plausible guess is this. Since they maintain that acceptance 
involves value judgments, they might well believe that acceptance of scientific 
hypotheses introduces an element of subjectivity into science. The odds maker 
view keeps this subjectivity out. Since subjectivity is thought to be undesirable 
in science, (5) and (6) are advocated . Furthermore , advocates of (5) and (6) 
think that the practical acceptance view is the only alternative to their view: 
they think that either one does not accept scientific hypotheses as a scientist 
or one accepts them in terms of practical values. One may guess that they 
believe that judgments about practical values are particularly subjective and 
rationally indefensible. 
This argument for the odds maker view of science seems to me to be a very 
weak one. First, as we have seen the practical acceptance view is not the only 
alternative to the odds maker view. There is also the theoretical acceptance 
view. Even if judgments about practical values are subjective and not capable 
of rational defense or criticism, judgments about theoretical values may not be 
subjective. Thus, if the acceptance of scientific hypotheses is based on theore­
tical values there might be nothing subjective in the acceptance of scientific 
hypotheses. 
Secondly. even if the practical acceptance view were the only alternative, it is 
not clear why judgments about practical values would necessarily be subjective. 
The idea that they are rests perhaps on a particular brand of non-cognitivism, 
i.e. the view that certain value judgments are expressions of emotion that are 
without rational basis. However, �ere is no good reason to embrace such a 
view and, indeed, such a view has serious problems. lt is important to see that 
naturalism in ethics is not the only alternative to the sort of crude non-cognitive 
view that would make judgments of practical value irrational and subjective. A 
naturalistic interpretation but also certain sophisticated non-cognitivist inter­
pretations of value judgments would entail that value judgments are rationally 
defensible or criticizable and hence objective.1 5 Consequently, non-cognitivism 
in ethics, a rejection of the odds maker view of science, and the objectivity of 
science are logically compatible. 
Now whether naturalism or some sophisticated type of non-cognitivism is a 
correct meta-ethical position is a long story, a story we cannot go into here. But 
there does certainly seem to be much more reason to embrace one of these 
meta-ethical positions than to embrace the crude non-cognitivism that seems to 
be presupposed by the odds maker view. There may, of course, be other 
reasons than the ones I have rejected here for accepting the odds maker view, 
but until they are brought forth there is good reason for rejecting that view of 
science . This does not mean, however, that the odds maker view may not be 
useful in science education. Indeed, I shall argue later that the odds maker view 
may in certain pedagogical contexts be very appropriate. 
So far I have rejected the odds maker view of science. Two \riews remain: the 
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theoretical acceptance view and the practical acceptance view. Let us interpret 
these two positions not as descriptive claims about how science does in fact 
operate but as claims about how science should operate. Interpreted in this 
way we can distinguish two variants of each position depending on which 
meaning of acceptance is at issue:  
(7) For a scientist qua scientist the values which determine acceptanceB or 
rejectionB of scientific hypotheses should be epistemic values only. 
(8) For a scientist qua scientist the values which determine the acceptanceu 
or rejection\] of scientific hypotheses should be epistemic values only. 
(9) For a scientist qua scientist the values which determine the acceptanceB 
or rejectionB of scientific hypotheses should be, at least in part, practical 
values. 
(10) For a scientist qua scientist the values which delermine acceptanceu or 
rejectionu of scientific hypotheses should be, at least in part, pra.ctical values. 
Consider now an argument of Rudner's for the practical acceptance view. 
Rudner argues: 
Obviously our decision regarding the evidence and respecting how strong is 
'strong enough' is going to be a function of the importance, in lhe typical 
ethical sense, of making a mistake in accepting or rej�ctfflg the hypothesis. 
Thus to take a crude but easily manageable example, if the hypothesis under 
consideration were to the effect that a toxic ingredient of a drug was present 
in lethal quantity, we would require a relatively high degree of confirmation 
or confidence before accepting the hypothesis-for the consequences of 
making a mistake here are exceeding grave by our moral standards.1 6 
Undoubtedly Rtidnel!' assumes here that the drug will be given to human 
beings for presumably if the drug were given to monkeys the consequences of 
making a mistake would not be "exceeding grave" by our moral standards. 
Rudner's argument is an excellent argument for (10), that is, it is an argument 
for the advisability of taking practical values into account. if one acceptsu or 
rejectsu a hypothesis. Thus if one were Lo act as if the hypo thesis lhal the drug 
was not toxic were true in the context of medical therapy the danger to human 
life would have to be taken into account. But this says nothing about whether 
one should accept8 or reject8 the hypothesis and with respect to acceptanceB 
or rejectionB of the hypothesis, only epistemic values seem to be relevant. Thus 
Rudner's argument does provide good reason for maintaining that (10) is correct 
and that (8)Js not correct but it provides no reason for maintaining that (9) is 
correct and that (7) is not. 
Leach gives another argument for the practical acceptance view.1 7  The 
strategy of Leach's argument is to show that what I have called acceptanceB 
involves acceptancesu and that despite my attempt to separate these two 
senses of acceptance there is a close connection between them. Leach admits, of 
course, that one can not straight-away identicy acceptance6 and acceptanceu. 
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To say that one believes that the hypothesis is true is not to say that one would 
act on the hypothesis in a given context, that one believes that the hypothesis 
would be a useful working hypothesis in this context. Leach d!oes argue however 
that there is a more indirect connection between them. 
He maintains that if some person P believes that H, then P has as a matter of 
fact a disposition to act on that hypothesis relative to some specific goal or other 
and that if a person P does have such a disposition, he will act on the hypothesis 
in certain circumstances. In this way Leach argues that there is a link between 
what I have called acceptanceB and acceptanceu· The link is a contingent one 
however. There is no logical necessity that if a person P believes that H, then P 
has a certain disposition to act. 
Consider a medical researcher who acceptsB that a drug does not have a 
toxic agent present in lethal quantity. I have suggested that despite his 
acceptanceB the researcher might not acceptu this hypothesis in the context of 
medical therapy with human beings. For because he is dealing with human 
beings the researcher might believe that although the evidence warrants 
acceptanceB the hypothesis does not warrant acceptanceu in this context. 
Leach's point, as I understand it, is that despite what I have just maintained, 
if the medical researcher believes that the drug does not have a toxic agent .in a 
lethal amount, then he has as a matter of fact a disposition to act as if the 
hypothesis is true relative to some specific goal or other and would act on the 
hypothesis given certain circumstances. Leach may well be correct in this. For 
the researcher may have a disposition to act on the hypothesis relative to the 
goal of curing monkeys and given appropriate circumstances would try the drug 
on the monkeys. 
Leach seems to believe that once he has shown that acceptanceu is connected 
in the way he suggested with a�ceptanceB practical values are relevant for 
determining whether someone should acceptB some hypothesis. But it is diffi­
cult to see why this is so. Consider the above case. The fact that the researcher's 
belief that the hypothesis is true is contingently connected with his disposition 
to act on the hypothesis in some practical context does not mean that practical 
values should determine whether he should acceptB the hypothesis. It is still 
possible that his acceptanceB of the hypothesis that the drug has a toxic agent 
is something that should be a function of the evidence and epistemic values only; 
and that his acceptanceu of the hypothesis, i.e. his disposition to act in a certain 
way in a given context is something that should in part be determined ·by prac­
tical goals. The fact (if it is a fact) that his disposition to act and his belief are 
contingently related may be of great psychological interest. However, it seems to 
have dubious relevance to the normative question of what sort of values are 
relevant to acceptanceB and acceptance0. 
To make this clearer consider an analogous case. Suppose there were a 
contingent relation between aesthetically pleasing actions and actions that are 
morally obligatory such t!hat X is a morally obligatory action if and only if X is 
an ae$theti<!ally pleasing action. If such a relation held, one could use moral 
criteria as reliable signs of aesthetic worth and vice versa. This is because the 
presence of moral criteria such as benevolence and justice would be reliable in-
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dicators of aesthetic criteria su�h as form and harmony, and conversely. How­
ever, this would not mean that aesthetic criteria were moral criteria or vice 
versa. Benevolence and justice would still be the relevant moral criteria and 
harmony and form would not be; harmony and form would be the relevant 
aesthetic criteria while justice and benevolence would not be. 
In a similar manner if there is a close contingent relation between 
acceptanceB and acceptanceu, a criterion used to evaluate whether one should 
acceptu a hypothesis, e.g. the criterion that acting on the hypothesis will 
adversely affect human life, might be a reliable indicator of whether one should 
acceptB this hypothesis. But this might be the case simply because practical 
consequences were a reliable indicator of the criteria relevant for acceptanceB, 
e.g. simplicity and explanatory power. If so it would no more mean that practi­
cal values are relevant to what one should acceptB than that moral criteria in the 
above example are relevant to what is aesthetically pleasing. · 
I conclude that Leach's argument gives no support for (9) and does not 
refute (7). Indeed, it seems to me that the above considerations suggest that 
(7) is correct and that (9) is incorrect. I find it difficult to see how practical con­
sequences of my acting on a hypothesis could be relevant to whether I should 
believe that a hypothesis is trl!-e unless acceptanceB and accepta!lceu are 
logically related in a very strong way. 
If for example "X is disposed to act as if p is true" entails "X believes that 
p," then if one should be disposed to act as if p is true because of certain 
practical c-0nsequences resulting from one's action, one should believe that p is 
true because of these consequences. Again if "X believes that p is true" entails 
"X is disposed to act as if p is true," then if one should not be disposed to act as 
if p is true because of bad practical consequences resulting from one's action, 
one should not believe that p is true because of these consequences. But these 
logical relations do not hold between acceptanceB and acceptanceu, between 
belief and the disposition to act as if. Any contingent relation of the kind 
specified by Leach is not strong enough to show the relevance of practical 
values for acceptanceB. As we have seen this does not exclude the presence of 
practical values being a reliable sign of the presence of epistemic values. But if 
they are, it does not mean that practical values are relevant for acceptanceB. 
Who is correct then: advocates of the practical acceptance view or advocates 
of the theoretical acceptance view? The answer to this depends on what sense of 
"acceptance" one is talking about. For we have seen that Rudner's argument has 
established (10) and refuted (8). So if we are talking about acceptanceu the 
practical a.cceptance view is correct. My criticism of Leach's argument suggests 
that practical values are irrelevant for acceptanceB unles.s certain unplausibly 
strong connections are supposed to hold between acceptance·B and acceptanceu· 
So if we are talking about acceptances (7) seems to be correct and (9) to be 
incorrect. However if this is so, it follows that the practical acceptance view is 
correct when acceptance is restricted to acceptanceu and that the theoretical 
acceptance view is correct when acceptance is restricted to acceptanceB. Thus 
with respect to what hypothesis a scientist should acceptB, i.e. believe is true, 
epistemic values are the only relevant ones while with respect to what a scientist 
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acceptsu, i.e. what he should be disposed to act on in a particular context, 
practical values should come into play .1 8 
Science Education and Acceptance 
What relevance has the above analysis for science education? Let us consider 
its relevance with respect to four types of science educators: (1) science 
teachers, (2) science curriculum planners, (3) science textbook writers, and 
(4) researchers in science education. 
Science Teachers 
Philosophy of science has analytic value and heuristic value for science 
teachers. Fo,r example, a science teacher explaining the rationale for theore­
tical physicists rejecting Newtonian mechanics might find it useful to keep in 
mind the distinction between acceptancel3 and acceptanceu · Although theore­tical physicists rejectB Newtonian physics, engineers and applied physicists 
acceptu Newtonian physics in some of their work. Indeed without this sort of 
distinction clearly in mind a science teacher might not be able to explain to his 
class (or get them to discover) the different value commitments of theoretical 
scientists and applied scientists and the different roles of Newtonian theory in 
theoretical and applied disciplines. 
Furthermore, the knowledge that value judgments are involved in the accep­
tance of hypotheses may enable the teacher to bring out to his class important 
similarities and perhaps differences between different branches of study. Thus 
bringing out the similar epistemic values involved in the acceptanceB of 
theories in physics, biology and chemistry may provide unity and coherence in 
science courses that is too often lacking and even perhaps suggest important 
similarities and differences with the humanities and the arts. 
We have seen that the odds maker view of science seems an implausible view 
of how a scientist qua scientist should operate. But it may be very suggestive for 
how science teachers should operate. Should science teachers maintain that 
certain scientific theories which are well supported by the evidence should be 
accepted relative to certain values? Or should science teachers become odds 
makers, presenting theories and the evidence for them, perhaps discussing the 
epistemic and practical values involved and then letting the student decide 
whether to accept or reject the theories without any recommendation from the 
teacher? In short, should the science teacher advocate the acceptance or re­
jection in either of the senses discussed of any scientific theories? 
I do not believe that any general answer can be given to this question. Much 
will depend on what the teacher is trying to do in the class, the level and 
maturity of the students and the type of material investigated. In small classes 
with mature and self-reliant students the odds maker approach may be stimu­
lating and productive; in large classes with naive and slow students the odds 
maker view approach may be too heady and anxiety provoking. But in any case 
the odds maker approach to teaching science is an approach that is well worth 
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considering in some contexts. 
Science Curriculum Planners 
Analytic philosophy of science has special relevance to science curriculum 
planners. This is because of the profound changes that have occurred in science 
curriculum theory in the last several years. Although a coherent articulation of 
this new movement is not complete, even now one can discern two important 
facets. First, recent science curriculum theorist.s have stressed that science should 
not be taught as an inflexible and unchanging body of doctrine. The tenta­
tiveness and revisionary character of science should be stressed in science edu· 
cation; science should be taught as a flexible, everchanging method of inquiry. 
Thus Schw.ab has argued: 
What is required is that in the very near future a substantial segment of our 
public become cognizant of science as a product of fluid enquiry, understand 
that it is a mode of investigation which rests on conceptual innovation, 
proceeds through uncertainty and failure, and eventualizes in knowledge 
which is contingent, dubitable and hard to come by.19 
In the area of social studies curriculum Massialas and Cox have maintained that 
social studies courses in the public school should have as one of their goals teach­
ing the individual a method of inquiry which allows him to "reconstruct his 
system of beliefs and values in the process of inquiry."20 
Secondly, recent science curriculum theorists have stressed that the structure 
of science should be taught. What exactly 'structure' means is not exactly clear 
but people who emphasize structure in science education seem to have in mind 
the basic concepts and methods of particular sciences and perhaps of all or most 
sciences. Thus Jerome Bruner, who has done so much to popularize the notion 
of structure In science education, illustrates the idea of structure by citing the 
concept of function as an "organizing concept" in biology2 1 and argues for the 
importance of this concept in the teaching of biology. Bruner also suggests that 
operational definition is a "recurrent idea that appears in virtually all branches 
of science."22 Here Bruner seems to be suggesting that structure sometimes re­
fers to concepts basic to all or most sciences and he goes on to argue that 
structure in this sense may play an essential role in at least general science 
courses. 
Schwab advocates the structural approach to scientific education also- He 
distinguishes three senses of structure that play an important role in science 
education.23 In one sense, to say that one should teach the structure of science 
is just to say that one should teach the interrelations between scientific 
disciplines. Under this heading would fall the relations between formal sciences, 
e.g. mathematics, and non-formal sciences as well as the relation between 
physical sciences and social sciences. In another sense to say that one should 
teach the structure of science is to say that one should teach the basic concepts 
and theories of a scientific discipline. For instance, one might teach the theory 
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of universal gravitation in physics. Schwab calls this substantive structure. In a 
third sense, to teach the structure of science one would teach the canons of 
proof and evidence in scientific disciplines. This Schwab calls syntactical 
structure. 
Whatever the merits of the inquiry and structure approach to science edu­
cation-and we believe they are many-analytic philosophy of science has great 
relevance. First it is analytic philosophy of science-in particular inductive 
logic-that investigates the logic of scientific inquiry. 24 Secondly, analytic 
philosophy of science, as we have already mentioned, investigates the basic con­
cepts of sciences. Analytic work has already been done by philosophers on the 
notion of function in biology,25 and on operational definitions.26 Philosophers 
of science have discussed at length the relation between formal and non-formal 
sciences27 and the relation between the natural and the social sciences.28 
Particular concepts of physics, biology, anthropology, psychology and so on 
have been analyzed by philosophers of science. The canons of proof and evi­
dence in science have been analyzed by analytic philosophers of science and 
inductive logicians. 2 9 
It would seem , therefore, that a science curriculum construed in terms of 
inquiry and structure would be illuminated by the work of analytic philosophers 
of science, and that curriculum planners who utilized the notions of inquiry and 
structure in their work would benefit from the study of analytic philosophy of 
science. Indeed, it would not be too far wrong to say that the educational 
potential of the inquiry and structure approach to science education will not be 
fully realized until science educators realize the need for the analysis and clar­
ification of the key notions of inquiry and structure. 
One of the key notions in scientific inquiry and the structure of science is the 
notion of acceptance. Part of scientific inquiry-except on the odds maker view 
of science, a view which we have found no reason to embrace-is the tentative 
acceptance and rejection of hypotheses. Acceptance also seems to be one of 
those general notions that Bruner has in mind when he talks about the structure 
of science. Schwab's syntactical structure is concerned with the canons of proof 
and evidence in scientific disciplines. But as we have seen the canons of evidence 
and proof ar·e closely connected with the gains and losses involved in accepting 
or rejecting hypotheses in terms of practical and theoretical values. It seems ob­
vious that curriculum theorists who would teach science as inquiry and who 
would teach the structure of science can profit from the philosophical analysis 
of the relation between acceptance and values. 
Science Textbook Writers 
Analytic philosophy of science has both analytic and heuristic value for 
science textbook writers. The science textbook \\'titer often deals with general 
concepts in his work that have been analysed and discussed at length by analytic 
philosophers of science. Tihe textbook writer is usually ignorant of these ana­
lyses and the textbook which is the result of his work suffers accordingly. 
That the scientist qua scientist may make value judgments in the acceptance 
95 
14
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 4 [1973], No. 1, Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol4/iss1/9
VALUE JUDGEMENTS AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF HYPOTHESES 
of scientific hypotheses is something that is usually overlooked in the typical 
science textbook. Indeed, science textbook writers often present complex and 
difficult scientific theories along with the most simple minded views about the 
acceptance of these theories. 
Consider for example a passage in ESCP Investigating the Earth. The authors 
say 
What is the difference between evidence and proof'? . . .  Evidence is ob­
servation that tends to support a conclusion. A conclusion is an interpre­
tation or judgment based on the evidence. When there is a little evidence 
for it a conclusion is only probable. The conclusion becomes proved when 
there is sufficient evidence to support it. 30 
Now one plausible way of interpreting this passage is that when the authors 
say that the conclusion becomes proved when there is sufficient evidence to 
support the conclusion they mean that the conclusion should be accepted. Since 
·no evidence ever makes the conclusion certain the question of when the evidence 
is "sufficient" for acceptance remains. The authors say nothing about this and 
indeed do not even seem to realize there is a problem. However, it is here, as we 
have seen, that value judgments enter into the picture. The question is what is at 
stake either epistemologically or practically, what gain and losses might accrue, 
in accepting a hypothesis that is less than certain. 
Consider, for example, acceptanceB and suppose the hypothesis at issue is 
the hypothesis that some particular individual has ESP. Now the acceptanceB of 
this hypothesis may have grave repercussions on the whole scientific framework 
since it is not implausible to suppose that ESP can not at the present time be 
easily assimilated into our scientific framework . To assimilate this hypothesis 
without radical change in our basic assumptions may involve the acceptanceB 
of a variety of ad hoc hypotheses which may seriously affect the over-ail 
shnplictty of the sci1:mtific world view. Since simplicity is one epistemic value 
sought in science, what will be considered sufficient evidence for the acceptance 
of the ESP hypothesis may have to be different from more typical cases of 
acceptanceB where this simplicity is not in question. 
Supposing acceptanceu is at issue, then practical values enter into the pic­
ture. Suppose the hypothesis is that a drug is a cure for cancer and has no toxic 
side effects. As we have seen much would depend here on the context of the 
acceptanceu e.g. whether it involved human or animal subjects. What would be 
sufficient evidence in the one case would not be sufficient in the other. 
There is no discussion of these points in Investigating the Earth. This is. 
especially unfortunate since students using this book are asked by the authors 
whether certain data is evidence or proof that the earth is round. Interpreted in 
the way we have suggested this comes down to asking whether certain evidence 
is sufficient for accepting the hypothesis that the earth is round. It is unclear 
how students could possibly answer such a question unless the authors clarified 
the values which are at stake in the acceptance of the hypothesis and what sort 
of acceptance is at issue. For example, in the context of a long ocean trip it 
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Inight make some difference if acceptanceu or acceptanceB was at issue. For 
Magellan certain practical values were at issue e.g. the value of his life and his 
crew in the acceptanceu of the hypothesis. If only acceptanceB were at issue 
one might want to know how the hypothesis that the earth is round, if it were 
acceptedB, would affect certain epistemic values such as the simplicity of the 
scientific framework. 
Knowledge of the philosophy of science could have had analytic value for the 
authors of Investigating the Earth. It takes little imagination to see how such 
knowledge might also have suggested different approaches to the material, i.e. 
have had heuristic value. For example, some clear idea that values enter into the 
acceptance of hypotheses in science might have suggested to the authors a 
number of new examples to utilize in the text, ones that bring out some of the 
epistemic and practical values that operate in the acceptance of hypotheses in 
science. Moreover, knowledge of the importance of values in the acceptance of 
scientific hypotheses might have suggested that different epistemic values 
operate in the context of pseudo·science than in science. The "flat earthers" 
for example can acceptB t!hat the earth is flat so long as certain complex aux· 
iliary hypotheses are accepted. A discussion of whether flat earthers with their 
strange beliefs and rp.odes of reasoning can be committed to the epistemic 
value of simplicity that scientists are committed to might provide an illuminating 
contrast with scientific epistemic values. 3 l 
Researchers in Science Education 
Analytic philosophy of science has analytic and heuristic value for researchers 
in science education. We have already mentioned in passing one question that 
might be pursued in such research, namely: What affect does a science teacher 
who adopts the odds maker view have on his students? We have suggested 
earlier that a science teacher might adopt the odds maker view in certain con­
texts. Whether this approach would be fruitful is something the educational 
researcher can help decide. In any case, a number of hypotheses suggest them­
selves. For example, since on the odds maker approach to science teaching the 
teacher never advocates the acceptance of any hypotheses and the student is 
left entirely on his own whether he accepts or rejects a hypothesis the following 
hypothesis li is suggested: 
H Science teachers who teach science as odd makers tend to produce students 
who are less dogmatic than do science teachers who do not teach science as 
odd makers. 
Whether H is true is something that only educational research can decide. 
Educational researchers in their work acceptu or rejectu hypotheses e.g. 
hypothesis H suggested above, in the light of the evidence and certain practical 
values. 
To use a recent example from educational psychology: Should educational 
researchers acceptu the hypothesis that Whites as a group have a higher I. Q. 
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than Blacks as a group the difference between I.Q. being due to genetic factors? 
Whether educational researchers should acceptu this hypothesis should involve 
the consideration of the practical values involved in doing so. One effect of 
educational researchers acceptingu this hypothesis in their work might be 
serious racial unrest. Whether this effect is likely is an open question but if it is 
the value of domestic peace and human brotherhood must be weighed against 
any epistemic values that such research might achieve. 
Perhaps part of the controversy between Jensen and his critics is over just 
this point. Jensen in some of his writing plays down the question of whether 
people should acceptB his hypothesis about White genetic superiority.32 He 
may be interpreted as advocating, rather, that scientists should take his hypo­
thesis seriously; that they should consider it a fruitful working hypothesis in 
the context of empirical research at least, that the hypothesis should be 
acceptedu. Either Jensen seems not to consider the practical values involved in 
doing this or else he seems to believe that no practical considerations could 
outweigh the epistemic gains. His critics, on the other hand, take the practical 
values involved very seriously and play down any possible epistemic values that 
might be the result of scientists acceptingB his hypothesis. 
It is difficult to say who is correct in this controversy. But two points need 
to be stressed. First, acceptingu Jensen's hypothesis in the context of genetic 
research does not entail that one should acceptu this hypothesis in the context 
of educational policy making. Secondly, acceptingu Jensen's hypothesis in the 
context of educational policy making does not entail that the traditional goal 
of educational equality should be given up. Indeed it might be plausibly argued 
that far from Jensen's hypothesis justifying giving Blacks an inferior education it 
suggests that Blacks should be given an intensive and superior education not for 
environmental deprivation but for genetic deprivation.33 
Perhaps if these points were clearly understood the acceptanceu of Jensen's 
hypothesis in the context of empirical research would not be thought to have 
such drastic practical consequences. In any case some understandin·g of the 
practical and epistemic values involved in the acceptance of scientific hypo­
theses may bring some mumination to this controversy. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that a recent controversy in the philosophy of science con­
cerning the acceptance of scientific hypotheses is illuminating for science 
education; that clarification and analysis of this controversy provides insights 
useful to science educators. I have tried to sketch in what some of these insights 
might be for various types of science educators. It is my hope that science 
educators will take these suggestions seriously; I hope even more that philos­
ophers of science will take science education seriously enough to make other 
suggestions and criticize the ones I have made. 
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